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The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement Act (FAIR) increased farmer’s exposure to downside
risk and raised farmer, lender, and congressional interest in the use of alternative instruments to manage
income risk.  One response has been a proliferation of federally facilitated insurance products.  The
development of new insurance products is likely to continue because the Agricultural Risk Protection Act
of 2000 provides financial incentives for new private sector insurance product development and increases
insurance premium subsidies to encourage higher participation and coverage levels.
Farmers now have a wide array of instruments for managing income risk.  Futures, forward
contracts, and other derivative pricing instruments allow flexible pricing strategies while multiple-peril
(MP) yield insurance, which  triggers payoffs based on individual-farm yield shortfalls, has long been an
option to manage yield risk.  More recently, area-yield insurance, which triggers payoffs based on county
yield shortfalls, has been made available to many farmers.
Farmers can combine pricing instruments with yield insurance to manage income risk.  However,
this involves selecting multiple risk management instruments and determining the appropriate level of use
for each instrument, and may still leave the farmer facing significant income risk exposure.  Revenue
insurance is the latest risk management innovation available to farmers.  By providing direct protection
against revenue shortfalls, revenue insurance may be easier for farmers to use and offer better risk
protection than existing price and yield management instruments.  Revenue insurance, like yield insurance,
can potentially feature a variety of  designs including indemnification based on an individual-farm or area
index, and/or alternative methods to value shortfalls.
Our objective is to investigate the relative performance of alternative  insurance contract designs
and  the ability of revenue insurance to substitute for existing price and yield risk management instruments. 
Performance is measured by a willingness-to-pay measure in an expected utility framework for an
individual corn farmer.  The farmer is allowed to use various portfolios of risk management instruments3
that include combinations of pre-harvest-pricing instruments and  yield or revenue insurance.  The
insurance instruments are included in portfolios under a variety of design specifications to investigate the
impact of each design feature on performance.  Modeling is conducted with both actuarially fair and unfair
farmer premiums; in high and low relative price risk environments; and with zero and negative price-yield
correlation.  Numerical simulation and optimization methods are used because of the complex nature of the
decision problem.
The results show that, without replacement pricing, a combination of futures and yield insurance
outperforms revenue insurance.  However, when replacement pricing is used, portfolios of revenue
insurance and futures are preferred to yield insurance and futures.  Under current restrictions, the farmer
finds portfolios of revenue insurance with replacement pricing and futures more effective than portfolios
without replacement pricing.  It is also shown that relaxing the “ad hoc” coverage restrictions on area-
insurance  may impact relative portfolio performance and increase farmer welfare.  Insurance companies
and policy makers will find the study results useful in modifying current insurance products and developing
future products.  Farmers, agribusiness providers, and extension agents can use the results to gain insights
about the ability of different insurance products to accomplish farmers' risk management objectives.
Background
Programs currently administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA)  have  provided
some form of MP crop yield  insurance to U.S. farmers since 1938.  The Federal Crop Insurance Act of
1980 expanded the scope of MP  programs in terms of crops covered, counties covered, and insurance
contract design; and also facilitated privatization of the delivery system.  Recently, the Federal Crop
Insurance Reform and Reorganization Act of 1994 enabled pilot testing of revenue  insurance products.  
The performance of MP insurance has been challenged on many fronts. Congress has been
concerned that participation is low and the size of insurance delivery costs are high; while farmers have4
argued  premium rates often exceed underlying risk and that risk group classification is inadequate.  Thus,
some changes in MP programs have been directed toward mitigation of  moral hazard, adverse selection,
and administrative cost problems associated with implementing an insurance program based on individual
farm yields. Other changes have focused on altering features of existing products such as improving
methods to calculate expected yields, increasing coverage percentages (reducing deductibles),  introducing
disappearing deductible coverage, and extending protection to include revenue products. 
One of the approaches to ameliorating moral hazard, adverse selection, and administrative cost
problems was to offer a yield insurance that triggers on county yield rather than individual-farm yield
(Halcrow).  In 1988, the Commission for the Improvement of Crop Insurance suggested development of a
pilot program that would  indemnify based on shortfalls below an area-yield index.  In 1994, RMA began
offering the Group Risk Plan (GRP) where yield losses are indemnified based upon county yield shortfalls
(Baquet and Skees; Skees, Black and Barnett). Indemnification is calculated by multiplying the shortfall
below the trigger yield times the dollar value of protection selected by the farmer.  A drawback of an area-
yield insurance program is that the indemnity payout is no longer perfectly correlated with the farmer's
actual yield loss.  This yield “basis risk”  reduces  the ability of the insurance instrument to manage
individual farm revenue risk.  In addition, GRP does not contain the prevented-planting and yield-quality
adjustment features contained in MP insurance policies.
RMA initiated an Income Protection contract (IP) in 1997 for pilot testing in selected counties for a
variety of crops.  The index for IP coverage is the farm’s historical average yield times the average harvest
futures price for a pre-planting period.  Similar to the MP individual-yield contract, the IP revenue
guarantee is a percentage of index value. If a farmer’s realized revenue index falls below the guarantee, the
farmer receives an indemnity payment equal to the shortfall.
Three additional revenue insurance contracts have been developed by private insurance companies
and offered  on a pilot basis.  RMA provides reinsurance and subsidies on these products equivalent to5
what is provided for MP and IP.  Revenue assurance (RA), developed by the Iowa Farm Bureau Insurance,
is similar to IP.  However, RA permits insuring crops individually or as the combined revenue from
multiple crops.  RA also features premium discounts for spatial diversification and uses a different rating
methodology than IP to determine premiums. 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), developed by Redland’s Insurance Company differs from the IP
policy in that the revenue index guarantee is based upon replacement price coverage, which is the greater
of  the realized harvest futures price and the pre-plant harvest futures price.  The designer’s objective was
to increase the use of pre-harvest pricing by reducing the delivery “risk.”  That is, if the output forward
contracted exceeds realized yield, the farmer must buy back a  portion of the contracted output at the
realized local harvest price. Yield insurance can reduce this risk but the farmer still faces the risk that the
replacement price will exceed the pre-planting forward contract price.  CRC can be viewed as a contract
with two alternative trigger indexes. If the futures price at harvest is less than the pre-planting futures
price, the contract operates as a pure revenue-index contract, like the IP contract. However, if the harvest
futures price exceeds the pre-plant futures price, the contract is equivalent to a yield contract with yield
shortfalls indemnified at the harvest futures price.   Redland also offers a replacement pricing product
called Market Value Protection (MVP) which can be added as a supplement to MP individual-yield
insurance.
Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) was developed by the IGF  insurance company.  GRIP is
similar to IP except that indemnification is based on an area-revenue index as opposed to the farmer's
individual-revenue index.  As in area-yield GRP insurance, the area-revenue GRIP contract eliminates
many of the moral hazard, adverse selection, and administrative costs associated with individual-index
revenue insurance, but subjects the farmer to additional index-basis risk.  Beginning in 2001, supplemental
replacement price coverage will be available for GRIP contracts.6
These insurance instruments permit insuring yields or revenues where indemnification is based on
individual- or area-indices either with or without replacement price coverage.  Each of the instruments can
also be combined with available pre-harvest pricing instruments, offering farmers a flexible, but complex,
set of risk management instruments.
Previous Studies 
Miranda explores insurance indemnification based on area-yield indices and finds the lower
transaction costs associated with area-yield insurance, along with potentially higher coverage levels, could
allow better risk protection than individual-yield insurance to many farmers.  Mahul examines the optimal
design of area-yield insurance contracts and finds the optimal contract design depends on the sensitivity of
farm yield to area yield.  The implications of combining insurance instruments with other risk management
instruments in a farmer’s portfolio are not addressed in these studies.
Myers explores the simultaneous use of yield  insurance and futures contracts while Poitras
examines the use of futures with yield  and revenue insurance.  These studies provide useful insights into
the use of insurance contracts in a portfolio setting but are limited by restrictive assumptions on price and
yield distributions, farmer preferences, and/or contract designs.
Wang, et al. use numerical techniques to investigate the impacts of alternative yield insurance
designs on portfolio choice and welfare for an individual corn farmer. The effects of alternative yield
indices (individual versus area), coverage restrictions, number of contracts purchased per acre,
indemnification pricing schemes, and premium wedges are examined.  Futures, options, and yield insurance
were considered separately and in various combinations in the farmer’s risk management portfolio.
Performance was explored in a two period model solving for optimal futures and options hedge ratios and
for optimal insurance coverage.  The results indicate area-yield insurance can perform nearly as well or
better than individual-yield insurance for many farmers.   The performance of individual-yield relative to7
area-yield insurance was found to be sensitive to the premium wedge on individual-yield insurance as well
as the incorporation of pricing instruments in the portfolio. The study also finds optimal coverage levels for
area-yield insurance are significantly higher than currently permitted by RMA.  Revenue insurance and
replacement price coverage were not addressed in the study.
Heifner and Coble use numerical methods to evaluate the performance of alternative insurance
contract designs for representative corn, soybean, and wheat farms at four locations across the US. 
Individual-index insurance contracts, including a form of individual-revenue insurance, are evaluated in
portfolios with and without replacement price coverage.  Revenue insurance is found to outperform yield
insurance when no pre-harvest pricing is used.  However, when pre-harvest pricing is included in the
portfolio yield insurance becomes competitive with revenue insurance.  This study assumes fixed coverage
levels and that all farmers pay an actuarially fair premium and receive a subsidy.  In addition, area-index
insurance designs are not considered.
The remainder of this paper extends previous work  by comparing the performance of futures and
yield insurance portfolios to portfolios of revenue insurance with and without futures.  Here we allow the
farmer to select optimal hedge ratios for each risk management instrument in the portfolio and then evaluate
the performance of alternative index types (individual versus area), the impacts of coverage restrictions and
premium wedges, and the role of replacement price coverage.
Model
The decision problem is characterized by an individual farmer who is assumed to choose a
portfolio of risk management instruments prior to planting that maximizes expected utility of wealth at
harvest.  Choices are modeled in a two period context.  Prior to planting, the farmer forms an estimate of








u[w ￿ %(p;y;x)] g(p,y￿6)dpdy (1)
%(p,y;x) ￿ NP ￿ PHP ￿ YI ￿ RI (2)
and profit is determined.  Prior to planting, the farmer chooses the portfolio of risk management
instruments, x, that maximize the expected utility of  wealth,
where   is an increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, w is the initial wealth u(#)
level per acre,   is the profit per acre, and   is the joint density for harvest prices and yields %(#)g ( #￿6)
conditional on 6, the set of information available when the portfolio is selected prior to planting.
1  The
random price vector p consists of cash and futures prices for corn at harvest, as well as the prices used to
indemnify the alternative insurance instruments.  The random yield vector y contains the farmer’s
individual yield at harvest and the yield indices used to indemnify the alternative insurance instruments. 
The utility function is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
where   and the constant relative risk aversion parameter is set at ￿ = 2.
2 u(w) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿1w (1￿￿)
The profit function consists of up to four components:
where NP = ; py ￿ c(y)
PHP =  ; h(fo ￿ f)
YI = ; and sc pcmax[0, xcE(yc) ￿ yc] ￿ ￿cac(sc,x c,pc,E(yc))
RI = . sr max[0, xrprE(yr) ￿ fyr] ￿ ￿rar(sr,xr,pr,E(yr),f0)
The NP component is the  profit from producing and selling corn without using any risk
management instruments.  Therefore p is the local cash price at harvest, y is the farmer’s yield at harvest,
and   is production cost.
3  The PHP component is the net return from pre-harvest pricing.  Here h is the c(#)9
amount of futures contracts sold (purchased if negative) prior to planting, fo is the initial futures price when
h is selected, f is the futures price at harvest.
4
The YI and RI components are net returns from using yield insurance and revenue insurance,
respectively.  When using individual-index insurance the farmer is required to insure all planted acres so
the acreage scaling factors sc and sr are restricted to equal one.  If the farmer elects to use area-index
insurance the effective amount of insurance per acre can be adjusted by selecting acreage scaling factors
that differ from one. In the YI component the term pc is the price used to indemnify the yield shortfalls for
the chosen insurance instrument, yc is the yield index used to determine yield shortfalls,   is the E(yc)
expected value at planting of the yield index, xc is the proportion of expected yield index that will trigger
indemnification, and    is the actuarially fair yield insurance premium.  The constant ￿c (wedge) is used ac(#)
to adjust the insurance premium if premiums paid exceed the underlying risk.  The price index, pc, could be
set at the initial futures price, the realized futures price, or some other notion of expected price.   For
contracts with replacement price coverage, pc = max (f, f0).  The random yield index yc could reflect the
farmer's actual yield level (as in the MP contract) or some area-yield index (as in the GRP contract).
   The RI component is the net return from using revenue insurance.  Here pr is the price index used
determine the trigger revenue, yr is the yield index,   is the expected value at planting of the yield E(yr)
index, and xr is the proportion of expected revenue that will trigger indemnification. Using the farmer’s
yield as the yield index results in individual-revenue insurance  (similar to the IP contract), while using an
area-yield index produces area-revenue  insurance  (similar to the GRIP contract).   As in the yield
insurance case, for replacement price coverage pr = max (f, f0). The actuarially fair revenue insurance
premium is   and the constant ￿r (wedge) is used to adjust the insurance premium if premium paid ar(#)
exceeds the underlying risk.
The choice vector x = (h, xc, xr, sc, sr) consists of decisions surrounding the amount of futures to
trade and the coverage level and/or acreage scaling for the alternative insurance instruments.  It is assumed 10
decisions are made simultaneously in a portfolio setting given the known parameters and probability
distributions.  The profit function in (2) contains a stylized version of the major types of risk management
instruments now available to U.S. farmers.
Designs and Model Parameterization
We use the joint price-yield generating process at harvest conditional on information available at
planting, estimated by Wang et al. for an individual farmer in southwest Iowa for the 1994-95 crop year as
a starting point.
5  There is no closed-form solution for the conditional joint price-yield distribution at
planting and so a discrete estimate of the joint distribution is generated using stochastic simulation (Myers
and Hanson).  The frequency distribution of the simulated harvest prices and yields are then used as an
estimate of the joint distribution of prices and yields at harvest, conditional on information available at
planting.  
There is evidence the simulated conditional distribution is reflective of a historically low price risk
environment.  The coefficient variation for futures prices in the simulated distribution was about  15%
while Coble and Heifner find coefficient of futures price variations for corn is typically  in the range of
18% to 20%.  To explore the  impacts of the relative level of price to yield risk, we generate a second
scenario that reflects a relatively higher price risk environment.  The second joint price-yield distribution is
generated using the Wang et al. approach, but proportionally increasing the ARCH parameters by 140%, 
shifting the scale of the distribution, but retaining the original mean levels.  This produces a coefficient of 
variation for futures prices of around 20%.  Thus the second base scenario represents a situation where the
farmer faces “higher price risk” relative to a given level of yield risk. Two other corresponding joint
distributions were simulated with zero price-yield correlation.  This results in four simulated distributions: 
low price risk with zero correlation, low price risk with negative correlation, high price risk with zero
correlation, and high price risk with negative correlation.  The sample moments and correlations for the11
simulated distributions at harvest conditional on information available at planting are shown in Table 1.  
Analyzing the performance of the alternative insurance instruments using each simulated distribution
allows results to be generalized across the different risk environments.
The remaining parameters were selected to be representative of farmers in southwest Iowa during
the mid 1990s.  The initial wealth term, reflecting equity claims to such assets as land and machinery used
in the farming operation, is set at $500 per acre which is consistent with  Jolly and Olson.  Production cost,
adapted from Jolly and Olson, is specified as $2.18(E[y|6]) + $0.17y where E[y| 6] is the expected yield
conditional on information at planting.  The first term in the cost function reflects the costs of planting,
applying fertilizer and chemicals, and other incurred fixed costs in the production process; while the second
term reflects uncertain variable costs that depend on realized harvest levels, such as combining costs, grain
drying, and transportation costs from the field to the point of sale.  Futures prices are restricted to be
unbiased in the sense that expected gains from trading are zero so the futures price at planting is set equal
to expected future price at harvest conditional on information available at planting. 
In practice, coverage levels are restricted.  To reflect these restrictions, coverage for individual-
index instruments is allowed to be no more than 75% of expected index value which approximates the level
used by RMA to reduce exposure to potential moral hazard problems.
6  Coverage for area-index
instruments in the restricted cases is set at no more than 90% of the expected index value which also
reflects RMA policy.  However, the 90% area trigger restriction is “arbitrary” and could be set higher
because area-based instruments eliminate moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with
individual-index insurance. 
Despite federal subsidies, farmers using individual-index products often pay premiums above the
actuarially fair level because the current risk classification approach is imperfect (Skees).  RMA
reinsurance policies require all farmers in a given location and risk class be charged the same premium
which results in a “wedge” between the premium paid by the farmer and the farmer's actuarially fair12
premium.  RMA allows insurance providers to further classify farmers, for reinsurance purposes only,
indicating that both RMA and the insurance providers recognize these wedges exist and can vary
significantly across farmers.  To gain insights into the impacts of the premium wedge faced by farmers we
analyze individual-index products as actuarially fair (￿ = 1.0) and with a 30% wedge (￿ = 1.3).  Area-
index insurance is characterized by low transaction costs and all farmers face the same area-index
distribution.  Therefore, if adequate data is available to estimate the area-index distribution, premiums
should always be near actuarially fair so ￿ = 1.
We evaluate the ability of revenue insurance to substitute for existing price and yield management
instruments by examining the performance of six portfolios: individual-yield insurance with futures; area-
yield insurance with futures; individual revenue insurance; area-revenue insurance; individual-revenue
insurance with futures; and area-revenue insurance with futures. These portfolios are evaluated in different
economic environments including low price risk, high price risk, no price-yield correlation, and negative
price-yield correlation.  In addition, the impact of using replacement price coverage in each portfolio is
examined.
Results
In the absence of production cost uncertainty and basis risk, unrestricted actuarially-fair revenue
insurance based on individual-farm revenue is the “ideal” risk management instrument because, by
choosing a coverage level equal to the maximum possible revenue (zero deductible), the farmer can
eliminate all risk without impacting expected income.  In practice delivering actuarially-fair revenue
insurance to individual farmers with no coverage restrictions is not feasible because of moral hazard,
adverse selection, and administration cost problems.  Restricting coverage levels and acreage scaling can
help reduce these transaction costs.  However, these changes affect the ability of revenue contracts to
manage income risk.  In addition, the existence of uncertain production costs and/or basis risk further13
reduces the ability of revenue insurance to manage income risk.  Therefore, in practice, individual-index
revenue insurance can no longer completely eliminate income risk and other insurance designs may be more
valuable to the farmer. 
 To evaluate the performance of the alternative contract designs and portfolios of risk management
instruments the decision problem  in (1) is solved, subject to constraints on coverage and/or acreage
scaling, using the OPTMUM module of Gauss. The performance of the alternative risk management
portfolios is evaluated in terms of how much certain income must be added to the farmer’s  revenue stream
in a portfolio with no risk management instruments to generate the same level of expected utility achieved
with optimal use of the risk management instruments available in the portfolio.  The focus of the discussion
is on the relative performance of the different portfolios in terms of the willingness-to-pay measure.  For
completeness, the optimal futures, insurance coverage, and insured acreage hedge ratios are also shown for
each portfolio.
Insurance Contracts Designed without Replacement Price Coverage
We begin by examining the ability of revenue insurance to substitute for futures and yield
insurance  when insurance contracts are designed without replacement price coverage.    Table 2 shows the
optimal hedge ratios and willingness-to-pay values for the six alternative risk management portfolios under
various conditions the farmer might face.  An obvious result is that the risk environment faced by the
farmer impacts the performance of each portfolio.  Negative price-yield correlation decreases the value of
each portfolio because the “natural hedge” associated with the tendency of price and yield to move in
opposite directions causes some stabilization in income and reduces the incentive to eliminate price and
yield risks. The impacts of the risk environment on the performance of each portfolio also depends on
coverage restrictions, insured acreage restrictions and the size of any premium wedge faced by the farmer. 14
Restricting insurance coverage levels and/or increasing the premium wedge reduces the value of each
portfolio.
If we compare the value of a portfolio of yield insurance and futures to revenue insurance we see
that combining yield insurance and futures always outperforms revenue insurance by itself under current
contract restrictions.  This  result holds for both individual- and area-index insurance regardless of the risk
environment and/or premium wedge.  The flexible use of futures in portfolios with yield insurance allows
the farmer to better manage risk than using direct revenue insurance.  If the farmer uses both revenue
insurance and futures in a portfolio the difference in performance, relative to a portfolio of yield insurance
and futures, narrows.  However, yield insurance and futures still outperform revenue insurance and futures. 
The results show that under current insurance contract restrictions and without replacement pricing,
revenue insurance (with or without futures) is not able to completely substitute for a portfolio of yield
insurance and futures.
Under current contract restrictions, the preferred indemnification index (individual versus area)
depends on the size of the premium wedge faced by the farmer when using individual-index insurance. 
When the coverage restrictions are in place, portfolios with area-index insurance outperform portfolios with
individual-index insurance when the farmer faces the premium wedge on individual-index insurance.  Here
the less restrictive, lower-cost, area-index design more than offsets the associated index basis risk.  
However, when the farmer faces no premium wedge, portfolios with individual-index insurance outperform
portfolios with area-index insurance.  In other words, the less restrictive area-index restrictions by
themselves are not enough to offset the additional basis risk.  These results are consistent for both revenue
and yield insurance under current coverage restrictions.
As discussed previously, the use of area-index insurance eliminates the majority of moral hazard,
adverse selection, and transaction costs problems that hinder individual-index insurance.  Because of its
advantages, area-index insurance can potentially be offered to farmers with fewer restrictions and at a15
relatively lower cost than individual-index insurance.  If the “ad-hoc” area-index coverage restriction is
removed, the additional flexibility improves the performance of portfolios with area-index insurance and
changes the relative performance of portfolios that include revenue and yield insurance.  When the coverage
restrictions are removed, area-revenue insurance portfolios (with or without futures) are now preferred to
portfolios with area-yield insurance and futures.  The results show  unrestricted area-revenue insurance 
can completely substitute for unrestricted area-yield insurance and futures.  However, portfolios of
individual-index insurance and futures may still outperform unrestricted area insurance and futures, as is
the case when the farmer faces negative price-yield correlation and no premium wedge.
The results show that without replacement pricing, the preferred portfolio under current coverage
restrictions is individual-yield insurance and futures whenever the farmer pays an actuarially fair premium. 
When the farmer faces a premium wedge, the farmer prefers a portfolio of area-yield insurance and futures. 
Relaxing the area-insurance coverage restrictions improves the performance of the area-revenue and futures
portfolio enough so that it becomes the preferred portfolio in some cases.
Insurance Contracts Designed with Replacement Price Coverage
The use of replacement price coverage can significantly change the way each insurance instrument
performs in a given portfolio.  We first discuss the impacts replacement pricing has on the performance of
each portfolio and then examine the ability of revenue insurance with replacement pricing to substitute for
futures and yield insurance.  Table 3 shows the hedge ratios and willingness-to-pay values for the six
alternative portfolios when the insurance instruments are designed with replacement price coverage.  When
the farmer faces an actuarially fair premium, replacement price coverage increases the value of portfolios
containing individual-index insurance.  Here replacement pricing helps reduce unprotected income risk that
results from restrictions.  However, replacement pricing provides little or no additional risk protection to
farmers using area-yield insurance and futures.16
Replacement pricing lowers the value of portfolios consisting of only area-revenue insurance
regardless of whether or not coverage restrictions are in place.  This is because in the absence of coverage
restrictions and replacement pricing, the farmer is able to choose high area-revenue coverage in an effort to
reduce income risk.  At high coverage levels, replacement pricing adds up-side price risk that increases
income risk and consequently decreases the value of the portfolio.  The result also holds when coverage is
restricted because the farmer is able maintain “high coverage” by increasing scaled acreage to substitute for
restricted coverage.  Likewise portfolios with revenue insurance and futures lose value when replacement
pricing is used without current coverage restrictions because the up-side price risk once again increases
exposure to income risk.  In contrast,  portfolios with restricted area-revenue insurance and futures show
significant gains from using replacement pricing because the combination of replacement pricing and
futures can be used to reduce unwanted income risk that results from the coverage restriction.
Using replacement pricing when the farmer faces the premium wedge results in a larger decline in
expected income because replacement pricing increases the size of the actuarially fair premium from which
the proportional wedge is calculated.  When the farmer faces the premium wedge, replacement pricing will
only have value if it can decrease income risk enough to offset the cost associated with the additional
decline in expected income.  Portfolios of individual-revenue insurance and futures benefit from
replacement pricing even when the farmer faces the premium wedge, while individual-revenue insurance by
itself is, again, hurt by replacement pricing.  Portfolios of individual-yield insurance and futures benefit
from replacement pricing when there is a premium wedge and no price-yield correlation but receive little or
no benefit when there is negative price-yield correlation.
The relative performance of the risk management portfolios changes significantly when insurance
contracts are designed with replacement price coverage because of the differences in the pricing and payoff
structure of the insurance contracts.  When replacement pricing is used, portfolios of yield insurance and
futures again outperform portfolios consisting of only revenue insurance.  However, with no premium17
wedge, using insurance with replacement pricing and futures reverses the performance rankings compared
to portfolios  without replacement pricing.  When replacement pricing is used under current restrictions and
actuarially fair premiums, revenue insurance and futures now outperform yield insurance and futures.  And
when coverage restrictions are relaxed, area-yield insurance and futures now outperform area-revenue
insurance and futures.
The results show that under current restrictions individual-revenue insurance and futures is the
farmer’s preferred portfolio when the premium is actuarially fair.  When the farmer faces a premium
wedge, area-revenue insurance and futures becomes the preferred portfolio.  These portfolios are also
preferred to the portfolios without replacement pricing, indicating that, under current restrictions, a form of
revenue insurance with  replacement pricing is always preferred by the farmer.
If the coverage restrictions are lifted, and the farmer faces a premium wedge or no price-yield
correlation, the preferred portfolio includes  unrestricted area-revenue insurance without replacement
pricing.  However, when the farmer pays an actuarially fair premium and faces negative price-yield
correlation, individual-revenue insurance and futures is still preferred to unrestricted area-yield insurance
without replacement and futures, indicating the farmer will prefer replacement pricing in the portfolio he
selects in  this setting.  These results show that if current coverage restrictions are removed and
replacement pricing is available, the farmer always prefers a portfolio that includes a form of revenue
insurance to portfolios that contain yield insurance.
Summary and Conclusions
Changes in federal commodity programs have increased revenue-risk exposure for many farmers
and spurred interest in alternative risk management instruments.  Farmers have long been able to use
pricing instruments, such as futures contracts, in conjunction with yield insurance to manage revenue risk. 
In recent years the design features of the yield insurance have been modified in an effort to increase its use18
and effectiveness; while the latest innovation in risk management is to provide farmers with direct
protection against revenue shortfalls through the use of revenue insurance.
In this study, we examine whether revenue insurance can substitute for a portfolio of yield
insurance and futures under alternative design features and risk environments.  Numerical optimization and
simulation techniques are used to evaluate the behavior and well-being of an individual farmer using
combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, and pre-harvest pricing.  The model is calibrated using
parameters that reflect those faced by farmers in Southwest Iowa in the mid-1990s.  The robustness of the
results across time and space are evaluated by altering the base parameters and examining changes in the
farmer’s behavior.  The results extend earlier work in this area by allowing the farmer to select optimal
hedge ratios for both futures and insurance contracts, by evaluating alternative insurance design features
such as area-index indemnification, and by exploring the impacts of premium wedges.
The results show revenue insurance alone can not completely substitute for a portfolio of yield
insurance and futures contracts.   In addition yield insurance and futures are shown to perform as well or
better than revenue insurance (with or without futures) when the contracts are designed without
replacement price coverage.  However, when replacement price coverage is used, revenue insurance and
future outperform yield insurance with futures.   Under current contract restrictions, futures and either
individual-revenue or area-revenue insurance with replacement pricing are shown to be the best performing
portfolios.  Relaxing area-insurance coverage restrictions can alter these results and improve the risk
management ability of some farmers.  Although sensitivity analysis is conducted by altering the risk
structure faced by the farmer and the design of the insurance instruments, care must be taken in
generalizing the results beyond the cases presented here.19
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1. Profits and wealth are expressed on a per acre basis.  The results can be extended to the whole farm
by multiplying by the number of acres.
2. The relative risk aversion parameter of 2.0 falls with the range estimated in studies by Antle, Arrow,
Binswanger, Hamal and Anderson, and Myers.
3. The farmers yield is exogenous in the sense that all production decisions assumed to be fixed at
planting.
4. Commodity options were also included as a pre-harvest pricing instrument.  Consistent with Wang et.
al.  and Heifner and Coble, adding options to portfolios containing futures and insurance sometimes
resulted in complex hedging positions but generally added little value in terms of risk management.
In the interest of space we only report the results for pre-harvest pricing with futures.
5.  Wang et al. calibrate their model by using a bi-variate ARCH model to estimate the price generating
process for harvest prices.  An inverse hyperbolic sine function is then used to estimate the yield
generating process at the county level.  Farm-level yields are generated by re-scaling the county-level
yields.   The estimated models are used to simulate harvest price and yield distributions.  Correlation
between harvest prices and yields are imposed using the normal transformation procedure proposed
by Taylor.
6.  Eighty-five percent coverage has recently been authorized, and is being tested on a pilot basis.
ENDNOTES22
Table 1. Sample Moments and Correlations for Simulated Distributions
Variable











Low Price Risk Environment
Negative Price-Yield Correlation
Futures Price $2.56 $0.39 0.41 3.57 1.00 0.84 -0.37 -0.31
Cash Price $2.48 $0.38 0.43 3.55 1.00 -0.46 -0.38
County Yield 117.51bu/ac 30.40bu/ac -1.20 4.07 1.00 0.83
Farm Yield 117.52bu/ac 36.48bu/ac -0.97 3.28 1.00
Revenue $284.63 $89.20 -0.62 3.32
Zero-Price Yield Correlation
Futures Price $2.56 $0.39 0.41 3.57 1.00 0.84 0.03 0.05
Cash Price $2.48 $0.38 0.43 3.55 1.00 0.01 0.03
County Yield 117.51bu/ac 30.40bu/ac -1.20 4.07 1.00 0.83
Farm Yield 117.52bu/ac 36.48bu/ac -0.97 3.28 1.00
Revenue $292.24 $101.98 -0.41 2.93
High Price Risk Environment
Negative Price-Yield Correlation
Futures Price $2.56 $0.49 0.41 3.10 1.00 0.85 -0.40 -0.33
Cash Price $2.48 $0.51 0.50 3.45 1.00 -0.46 -0.38
County Yield 117.51bu/ac 30.40bu/ac -1.20 4.07 1.00 0.83
Farm Yield 117.51bu/ac 36.48bu/ac -0.97 3.28 1.00
Revenue $284.63 $92.94 -0.32 3.22
Zero Price-Yield Correlation
Futures Price $2.56 $0.49 0.41 3.10 1.00 0.85 0.00 0.05
Cash Price $2.48 $0.51 0.50 3.45 1.00 0.01 0.03
County Yield 117.51bu/ac 30.40bu/ac -1.20 4.07 1.00 0.83
Farm Yield 117.51bu/ac 36.48bu/ac -0.97 3.28 1.00
Revenue $292.43 $109.38 -0.15 2.84Table 2.  Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay Without Replacement Price Coverage
Zero Price-Yield Correlation Negative Price-Yield Correlation
Unrestricted Coverage Restricted Coverage Unrestricted Coverage Restricted Coverage
Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres
WTP Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres
WTP Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres











































































































































































































Notes: IY designates individual-yield insurance, IR designates individual-revenue insurance, AY designates area-yield insurance and AR designates area-revenue insurance. 
Max indicates maximum possible coverage (zero deductible).  The maximum index value as a proportion of the expected index value for the zero (negative) price-yield
correlation case is 1.43 (1.43) for IY insurance, 1.34 (1.34) for AY insurance, 1.97 (1.90) for IR insurance, and 1.87 (1.79) for AR insurance.Table 3.  Hedge Ratios and Willingness to Pay with Replacement Price Coverage
Zero Price-Yield Correlation Negative Price-Yield Correlation
Unrestricted Coverage Restricted Coverage Unrestricted Coverage Restricted Coverage
Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres
WTP Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres
WTP Fut. Cov. Scaled
Acres











































































































































































































Notes: IY designates individual-yield insurance, IR designates individual-revenue insurance, AY designates area-yield insurance and AR designates area-revenue insurance. 
Max indicates maximum possible coverage (zero deductible).   The maximum index value as a proportion of the expected index value for the zero (negative) price-yield
correlation case is 1.43 (1.43) for IY insurance, 1.34 (1.34) for AY insurance, 1.97 (1.90) for IR insurance, and 1.87 (1.79) for AR insurance.